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Renewal.

            The Second Vatican Council was aimed at formulating principles for the renewal of ecclesial life in all its aspects. More than thirty years later, varying evaluations of the results are made. Some persons, perhaps feeling that renewal was a dangerous idea in itself, hold that in any case it went off the tracks from the start. Others think that it ran into too much entrenched opposition from conservative forces, and is now largely dead-ended, an ideal or a dream they no longer really believe in. For others again, it remains a program of hope, which is still being attempted or needs to be attempted. Pope John Paul II is evidently one of these; he has been a firm believer in renewal from the start of his ministry, which he has constantly spent in the effort to bring it about.

            Efforts at renewal have undoubtedly been there: in the theological field, and in those of liturgy, pastoral work, inculturation, etc. Some initiatives have progressed rapidly, producing results that seem to show genuine renewal. Others however give the impression of lacking drive, and perhaps of running out of steam altogether.

            If we turn to canon law, its renewal according to the spirit of Vatican II can in a certain sense be said to have gone slowly, although not necessarily less steadily on that account. Slow progress was in fact necessary because a most important instrument of renewal in this field had first of all to be prepared. As will be remembered, the revision of the Code of Canon Law was announced at the same time as the Council. Once the Council was over, it was logical that this task be pursued according to the conciliar spirit and directives. The result was the new Code of Canon Law promulgated in 1983. So the basic instrument of renewal is now there; but we have only had it for little more than ten years, which is not a long period of time in ecclesial terms. More particularly, it is a short period for the emergence of new jurisprudence, where this may be necessary, in any consolidated fashion.

            A whole new approach characterizes the 1983 Code. On the one hand, in its structure and exposition of law, it departs from the more traditional juridic scheme based on a roman law model. It is rather built on an ecclesiological basis, the mystery of the Church, considered above all in the exercise of the three great missions or "munera" entrusted to it - the "munus docendi", the "munus sanctificandi", and the "munus regendi" - or the missions of teaching, sanctifying and ruling. On the other hand no small number of legal norms have been created or rewritten in a personalist key. It is the most notable of these - in the field of matrimonial law - that are the focus of attention in this study. The great challenge here has been to work from an adequate ecclesiological-personalist basis, without thereby rendering the final exposition less juridic.

            To my mind, genuine ecclesial renewal depends in a fundamental way on the renewal in the Church of a proper juridic sense, something that is inseparable from a sense of love for the law. In other words, it entails a renewal of juridical science in accordance with the conciliar understanding ()of the person and of ecclesial society; and a renewal of juridical practice seen as a service not of abstract principles and not only of truth, but very specially of persons, with their inherent human dignity, further enhanced by the christian vocation which is theirs.

            Here it is important to note that within the ecclesiology of the second Vatican Council, and also therefore within the renewal sought by it, an accidental or marginal place cannot be assigned to law. "Communio" - the gathering together of people in one in Christ - is the central and dominant ecclesiological theme of Vatican II, around which it develops its vision of the Church (cf. Lumen Gentium, Ch. I). "Communio" is a broad and rich expression, but also in a certain sense a rather vague one. Lumen Gentium makes it more concrete in the concept of the "People of God" (ib. Ch. II). Now the very notion of the Church as a "People" places emphasis on intersubjective relations, as necessarily characteristic of every society or people. Such relations ought to be just and harmonious: something that is not possible without the mediation of adequate laws and their adequate application.

            It is in this context that one of the great innovations of the Code should be appreciated: the affirmation and exposition of the rights of the faithful, which is naturally accompanied (a point not to be overlooked) by an emphasis on the corresponding duties.

            It is not difficult to illustrate the renewing power of the law - of a more "personalist" law - or to offer suggestions as to how it should be applied in a truly renewing fashion. But it may be important first to recall the relationship - of deep harmony - between some fundamental aspects of the spirit of the Council, which might initially give the impression of standing in mutual contrast.

            At the same time as it proposed "communio", Vatican II also laid the bases for developing a vigorous personalist view of human life. Vatican II is centered not only on the community, but also on the person. In fact personalism can be said to be the characteristic philosophy of the Council. Now, a first reaction to this combination of concerns - community-centeredness and person-centeredness - could be to wonder if they can really go together. Is there not a tension between the two, one bearing in on the person and the other out on the community? Is there not even a logical opposition between them? Here is a a question that merits some examination.

Personalism

            Personalism is a view of man which places emphasis on his dignity as one made in the image of God: "the only creature", as Gaudium et Spes states, "that God has wanted for its own sake" (no. 24); "who stands above all things and whose rights and duties are universal and inviolable" (ib. 26). Personalism stresses man's dynamic character as a being called to fulfillment, particularly by freely committing himself to worthwhile and lasting values. It involves a strong consciousness of personal freedom - one's own and that of others - , accompanied by a no less strong consciousness of personal responsibility.

            Personalism maintains a keen awareness of basic personal rights; and will defend these from any violation; against one's self or against others. At the same time it proposes that whoever is conscious of rights, must be also conscious of duties. So, whoever possesses a true personalist spirit reacts with a natural respect towards others, in whom he sees brothers and sisters in Christ, children of the same Father. Personalism, in stressing duties towards other persons, sees the fulfillment of these duties as a means also of personal growth and self-fulfillment.

            Personalism sees no degradation of the person, no loss of personal stature, in the duty to search for the truth and to accept it steadfastly once found, nor in the conscious and voluntary response - a response of free obedience - to law or to legitimate authority. Less still does it see a threat to personal fulfillment or happiness in fidelity to the demands of a freely undertaken commitment. In such obedience and faithfulness, it rather sees an expression of the dignity of the person: the distinctive ability to discern values and, by responding to them, to achieve a fuller measure of selfhood. So Karol Wojtyla says, "the person realizes himself most adequately in [the fulfillment of] his obligations" (The Acting Person, Reidel, 1979, p. 169).

            Self-gift is of the essence of personalism, so much so that the key personalist text of the Council insists that "it is only in the sincere gift of himself that man can find himself" (Gaudium et Spes, no. 24). The personalist therefore tends to maintain an attitude of openness, appreciation and response, towards the values and qualities to be found in other people. This awareness of values in others is evidently a powerful basis for the building of community. In true personalism there is a natural alliance between the person - the individual human being - and the community. Personalist participation in community implies not a mere adaptation of interests to interests, but of person to person, based on the consciousness of common dignity, destiny and rights.

Individualism

            Christian personalism, under this title, is a recent development. It needs to be distinguished from another trend of thought and mode of life that has long characterized the Western world. This is secular individualism which (along with collectivism) has so largely dominated modern outlook and existence. The need to distinguish the two is all the more important in that individualism might easily be regarded as close to personalism, and even be mistaken for it (especially as certain forms of individualism use terminology that seems personalist); and yet it is entirely different, and in fact opposed to true christian personalism.

            In the philosophy of individualism, each one considers himself or herself as the supreme and fundamental good. Each one regards the interests of the community or society as subordinate to one's individual's interests; to my interests. Relations with others appear as natural perhaps or useful, insofar as they may offer occasions of personal satisfaction or profit, but remain of accidental importance. Where individual interests and the interests of others, or common interests, seem to clash, the individualist will put what he considers his own interests first. Individualism is no ally of community.

            In a certain sense we can say that individualism appears as a sort of mutilated or fake personalism. It also stresses rights, but not duties. It wants freedom to act, but not the responsibility of having to answer for one's actions. Demanding freedom, it is suspicious of any permanent commitment and remains reluctant to take binding decisions, which it often judges to be "self-alienating". Commitments, for the individualist, must always offer a "way out". Individualism wants to receive, but not to give; wants to be accepted by others (perhaps indeed with a clear sense of being worthy of acceptance), but is not so ready to accept others, or to see their worth.

            Individualism is almost always accompanied by philosophical relativism. A truly christian vision sees the human person as made to bind himself, intellectually and voluntarily, to true values (cfr. Veritatis Splendor, nos. 1; 6ss; 54ss, 99, etc). Skepticism about binding choices is usually the effect (and equally a cause) of skepticism about worthwhile values. The paradoxical result is that whoever sees nothing really worth choosing, ends up with a freedom not really worth having. Freedom after all is for choosing; and is a value in itself only in function of the value of what one can choose. There is little to be appreciated in a freedom which sees nothing worth a choice, or no choice or value worth sticking to. Few people envy the freedom of the scavenger in the midst of a heap of garbage.

            Individualism, precisely because of its mood of autonomous self-centeredness, stands in the way of personal development. Non est bonum homini esse solus - "it is not good for man to be alone" (Gen 2:18): words of the Bible to which we will have occasion to return. It is not good for man to be alone, or to think and act as if he were self-sufficient. He - she - can only develop in a relationship of openness, respect and donation towards others, not in one of isolation, indifference, self-interest or exploitation. John Paul II insists: "To be human means to be called to interpersonal communion" (Mulieris Dignitatem, n. 7); "acting and existing together with others", as he had already stressed before becoming Pope in the best known of his philosophical works (K. Wojtyla: The Acting Person, Reidel, 1979, passim). [Cf. "... the antithesis between individualism and personalism. Love, the civilization of love, is bound up with personalism" [while] "individualism threatens the civilization of love". [The individualist] "does not want to become a "sincere gift". Individualism thus remains ego-centric and selfish... Personalism is altruistic: it moves the person to become a gift for others and to discover joy in giving himself" (John Paul II: Letter to Families, 1994, no. 14)].

            The effect of individualism has been the object of considerable study especially in the field of economics. From an anthropological and christian viewpoint it matters more today to note its influence in education and in the main principles shaping social and interpersonal life; and in particular to grasp how it finds a new reinforced theoretical basis in certain psychological currents of thought strongly operative throughout the Western world. The cult of "self" is its typical modern expression. Essentially centered on the "ego", it proposes a type of self-fulfillment of the individual marked by a spirit of self-sufficiency, self-protection and self-aggrandizement. It is easy to see that the idea of "self-gift" is foreign to the individualist. He or she would scarcely understand and almost certainly not agree with the John Paul II's words in Crossing the Threshold of Hope: "these two aspects - the affirmation of the person as a person and the sincere gift of self - not only do not exclude each other, they mutually confirm and complete one another" (p. 202).

Self-fulfillment through self-giving

            There is a deep contrast between the idea of "self-sufficiency" presented by so much of modern psychology, and the christian ideal of realization through self-giving. Speaking to members of the American Psychiatric Association in 1993, the Pope insisted: "Only by transcending themselves and living a life of self-giving and openness to truth and love can individuals reach fulfillment" (Insegnamenti di Giovanni Paolo II, XVI,1 (1993), p. 14). Self-sufficiency is rather in the nature of a temptation for man; one he needs to overcome if he is to give himself and realize himself. Marriage in particular presents itself in the plan of nature, as a safeguard against the trap of self-sufficiency. As Vatican II says, "this partnership of man and woman constitutes the first form of communion between persons. For by his innermost nature man is a social being; and if he does not enter into relations with others he can neither live nor develop his gifts" (Gaudium et Spes, no. 12). The personalism of Vatican II stresses not so much man's independence, as his inter-dependence or co-dependence. This personalist spirit should be lived out in all the aspects of human life and relations, but it applies in a particular way to marriage. Man is especially made for the bonding of marriage, with its essential characteristics of mutual gift, mutual acceptance and mutual dependance.

            The chapters that follow will dwell on certain major aspects of married personalism which have been incorporated into the 1983 Code. Here, by way of anticipation, I would briefly draw attention to two points. On the one hand, the new way of expressing the object of marital consent given in c. 1057, § 2. By means of consent, the canon says, the spouses "mutually give and accept each other". On the other hand there is the even newer concept of the bonum coniugum - "the good of the spouses" - which c. 1055 now presents as an institutional end of marriage, on an equal level with procreation. A close connection appears between the two: consent understood as the spousal giving and accepting of one another, and marriage aimed at the good of the spouses. If as christian personalism holds, it is by giving oneself that one fulfills oneself, then it is necessarily an "imperfect" self (one that has not yet reached fulfillment) that one gives; and also of course an imperfect self that one accepts. Marriage is the covenanted meeting of two imperfect beings who, by mutually giving and accepting each other - in their virtues and possibilities, but also in their limitations and defects - , help one another to fulfillment or perfection. Without bearing these points in mind, one is not likely to reach an adequate understanding of this new and extraordinarily rich concept of the "good of the spouses".

            Therefore, in dealing with our overall subject - the personalist view of matrimony - it is always necessary to make a thorough analysis of approaches or interpretations that often appear in doctrine and jurisprudence. It is not enough to invoke conciliar personalism in order to be a personalist. Whoever conceives personal fulfillment in terms of self-assertion or self-satisfaction, is not attuned to the personalism of Vatican II. It is wise to bear this in mind, not being content with a superficial acceptance of phrases like "the renewed dignity of the person", "respect for the rights of each one", etc., because speech lends itself here to misunderstanding, and what is presented as christian personalism may, if more attentively examined, turn out to be of a secular and individualistic nature. Christian personalism can renew the conjugal community as well as the broader ecclesial community. Secular individualism tends to destroy both; it cannot be a force of renewal within the Church.

Marital breakdowns

            Where individualism is predominant, it undoubtedly tends to affect the outlook and values of those who marry. It can lead them to change not only their general concept of marriage, but even some essential aspect of the consent which they give or ought to give; with far-reaching anthropological and juridic repercussions.

            Judges, canonists and pastors in general must be attentive to these possibilities where they will often discover the root causes of pathological situations which may, after due investigation, lead to a declaration of nullity (naturally bearing in mind that while pathology may be a symptom of a null marriage, it is not necessarily so).

            My proposal in these pages is to reflect on broad and major aspects of the juridical consideration of marriage. The possible nullity of marriage is not the main theme of my study. However, since it will logically turn up and not infrequently, I would here like to offer some very general coniderations in its respect.

            Are there more failed marriages today? It certainly seems that there are. Are there more marriages which are null? I think that there are. Are there as many null marriages as there are declarations of nullity, and above all as many null marriages on the grounds of nullity which are usually invoked? I think that there are not.

            Should marriage be "defended" against nullity? Pre-marriage pastoral responsibility obviously calls for vigilance lest marriages be entered on that are certainly null (for instance, in virtue of one of the impediments listed in cc. 1083-1094). But, having allowed for such pre-marriage vigilance, one should be very cautious in speaking of the need to "defend" marriages against nullity. A declaration of nullity, when just, is a defense of marriage. It defends marriage against counterfeit. It defends the right of the individual Christian to a true marriage; or his or her right not to be held bound where in fact there never has been any bond. In this sense the work of our marriage tribunals is a defense both of marriage itself and of the rights of the faithful; and this is an exercise of justice.

            It is a matter of justice therefore, and for the good of individuals and ecclesial society, to declare the nullity of all those unions regarding which one can reach moral certainty that they are null [1]. But, even if a marriage has broken down, a declaration of nullity which is clearly groundless is not an exercise of justice, because it does not correspond to the truth. This lack of correspondence to the truth, despite apparently offering an immediate "solution" to a distressful situation, causes harm on all levels: the judicial, the social, and the level of the very parties most concerned in the matter. If there is a basic lack of truth in the new social and personal situation thus produced, then existential problems have been "solved" on the surface, but the thinking person is precluded from appraising the situation at a deeper level of interior sincerity and truthfulness. This creates a profound personal malaise which "hurts" at the very heart of a person's being.

            We must say more; because there is a still broader view to be taken here. Within the bleak panorama of broken-down marriages, what truth, justice and charity demand is above all that, through proper pastoral approaches and by the use of proper pastoral means, the breakdown of such valid marriages is avoided, so far as possible.

            Here there is a point which, however elementary and obvious, it may not be superfluous to recall. The new personalist view of marriage presented by Vatican II was not aimed at facilitating nullities, but at renewing matrimonial life. With this aim, the Council sought to offer a deeper understanding of the beauty and worthwhileness of the free commitment to a faithful and life-long marital love. Principles, guidelines and inspiration were given for initiatives and programmes directed to a renewed education for marriage: for renewed pre-marriage courses; and for new pastoral support during conjugal life. Much has been done, but much remains to be done.

            Avoiding the breakdown of a valid marriage, is a pastoral task rather than one which is properly canonical. But it should be evident that if our Tribunals are not following sound canonical-judicial practice, pastoral work is bound to suffer. Our tribunals too need to bear in mind that this is a moment when the Church wishes to present a new understanding of what favours a sound and solid marriage (which does not mean an easy marriage or one free from demands on the partners). They should also therefore avoid the temptation of thinking that the "personalist" solution to a difficult marriage situation is a declaration of nullity, whereas, if the objective basis for the nullity is missing, the true solution - if there is any - lies rather in the demands of genuine marital personalism. In such cases, the only real and just way out is to help the persons involved face up to these demands; and to do so in good time. When I say "in good time", I am thinking of the first contact (if it cannot be earlier) made by the parties or by one of them with the diocesan tribunal. The new Code, in c. 1676, lays stress on the particular pastoral opportunity and responsibility which falls to the judge who first receives a petition for nullity.

            It is the special lot of ecclesiastical judges to handle the "pathology" of marriage [2]; it is not an enviable task. All pastors however, and not judges alone, are constantly dealing with situations that can be classified as pathological. All of us in fact are a bit ill here on earth. If it were not so, we would be in no need of salvation. The best thing one can do with regard to pathology is to avoid it; and if this is not possible, to cure or at least lessen it, so that life can be healthier.

            It must be remembered however that only what is alive can be sick. When faced with a "union" that is breaking apart, the best solution would be to be able to say that there never was any pathology - at least any matrimonial pathology - because there never was any real marital union. To be able to declare, in other words, that there is no pathology because there is no life, there never was any life: the marriage was stillborn from the very start. That is what is implied in a declaration of nullity which, it should be repeated, when just, is a not only a necessary service but in the end a positive one both to individuals and to the community. But if the declaration is not just, then something doubly negative occurs. One declares dead what was - what is - alive: before God and so often before the consciences of those most involved. And one fosters a climate in which the many pathologies of matrimonial life receive - from pastors, counsellors, relatives or friends - less and less the advice by which they could in some way be cured, and the health of the marriage - always complex and relative - be recovered.

Law at the service of renewal

            A brief word could be said here about the positive and essential function of law in the life and renewal of the Church, within a personalist understanding. Law, truth, justice, are pillars of every society that proposes to offer its members the incentives, the channels and the guarantees necessary so that interpersonal life and relations develop in harmonious solidarity. Law is at the service of the truth, and even more concretely of justice: of what, according to the most attainable measure of truth, regulates the relations between persons, whether physical or juridic. That is why Saint Thomas says that "justice is at times called truth" ("quandoque iustitia veritas vocatur": II-II, q. 58, art. 4 ad 1), because it implies acting according to right reason or truth. In 1942 Pius XII told the Roman Rota that "the world has need of the truth which is justice, and of that justice which is truth" (AAS 34, 342). And in a 1961 address also to the Rota, John XXIII referred to the ministry of the ecclesiastical judge as a "ministerium veritatis", a ministry or service of the truth (AAS 53, 819).

            Some time ago I came across an article in a canonical review, complaining that an ecclesiastical judgment has no power to "heal" persons. The statement left me perplexed, for it is not so. Justice, properly administered, is a powerful stimulus to people. Appealing to the inner honesty of each one, to his or her deeper sense of values, it calls on them to put the proper rights of others above individual convenience or advantage. A just judgment - a declaration of justice - has great power to heal, or at least to point out the path to health.

            It is true that the judgment alone - the simple declaration of justice - may not be sufficient to restore health. It needs to be accepted personally, and put into effect. That is why even though justice always possesses healing power, in the end it is not just the declaration, but the acceptance of justice - even if this demands a sacrifice - that heals. To bring about that acceptance is a truly pastoral concern, to be shared by judges and other pastors.

The healing - renewing - power of justice

            When we say that good medicine heals, we are usually thinking of a healing process which demands not only a proper diagnosis but also getting the patient to accept the treatment necessary or the medicine prescribed, even if painful or bitter. The diagnosis or prescription - the judgment - is useless if there is no one capable of getting the sick person to accept and apply the remedy.

            So, both judges and pastors have a capacity to heal. But their healing capacity is not exercised if they let people think that a violation of rights or a failure to fulfill obligations is a healthy and not a pathological situation.

            Yes, one comes across cases where a civil or ecclesiastical judgment seems to leave one of the parties "wounded", and he or she lapses into a bitter and resentful attitude. But if the judgment is just, the person should not be that way, or be left that way. The genuine pastoral concern then must be to help the person out of that attitude, through seeing that the judgment, despite the personal hardships it may cause him or her, defends other people's rights. Only if the person accepts this, will the "wound" gradually disappear and the healing process be brought to completion. The pastor who does not share this aspect of pastoral concern may tell people they are well, but in fact he is leaving them sick.

            Before ending these introductory considerations, attention should be called to the possible instrumentalization of law; something that would occur if it were placed at the service of particular ideologies, or individual or group interests, and not at the service of truth and justice. If this were to occur (and there is no guarantee that it cannot happen in the ecclesial world, just as it is most certainly happening in the secular), then - apart from the enormous harm done to the whole of the life of the faithful - jurists themselves (judges, lawyers, teachers...) inevitably run the risk of losing the deep joy of their profession and calling, which in the end can derive only from the sense of serving the cause of justice and of truth. It is a danger that could particularly threaten the natural idealism of young people as they embark for the first time on the service of law, truth and justice within the Church.

            More than ever before, we need practitioners of the law who are in love with justice and truth; who are deeply conscious of the "Splendor Veritatis", and - a subject to which the Pope devoted his 1994 Address to the Rota - of the "Splendor Legis" or the "Splendor Iustitiae": the splendor of law and of justice. Only such jurists can help the great body of the faithful to understand the service given by the law to the life and vigor of the People of God. Turning more specifically to the field of our present interest, one could add that only such jurists will be capable of comprehending and reflecting the deep attractiveness of the Church's teaching on marriage, in the light also of the challenges it undoubtedly offers.

            Without a longing for "communio", without a proper understanding of christian personalism in its beauty as well as in its demands, without a deep love for truth and justice and law, renewal of ecclesial life in general and of marital life in particular is not likely to come about. It is true that justice alone cannot build individuals or build a community, bringing people together, and maintaining them together. But love for justice can.

NOTES

[1] Here I pass over the point that justice is not favored with regard to null marriages if a particular case is argued on "standard" grounds (which today almost always means consensual incapacity) which may be unsustainable (especially if it is appealed to higher instance), when the case would have been more solidly presented on other grounds such, for instance, as simulation.

[2] If, as it seems, the present overall situation of marriage offers specially pathological aspects, it is important to remember that one cannot deal with pathology unless one knows what good health is.